




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Introduction

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Introduction

Jill Vickers and Micheline de Sève

In this introduction, we have two distinct goals. First, we present a theoretical account of women's experiences with different kinds of nationalism. The goal of our project is to promote a political debate centred on Canada and informed by comparative scholarship about the relationships between feminisms and nationalisms and between women and nation-building. Except concerning Québec, too little attention has been paid to nationalism as experienced in Canada. And, although women's roles in nationalist movements and nation-building have been studied by feminist historians, as Micheline Dumont demonstrates, women's involvement in nationalisms and nation-building is virtually absent from mainstream debates, which still function largely within a male-centred, Euro-American discourse. We focus on Canadian feminist and women-centred explorations that link gender and nation and sometimes race.

In Part One, we as editors theorise women's diverse experiences with collective identities in Canada as a "New World" settler society¹ highlighting women's participation in democratic nationalism. We explore links among nationalism, women's citizenship and democracy to theorise how English-Canadian women and Québécoises gained and exercised their rights as citizens in part through active participation in the competing nationalisms they helped develop. We developed our position as we participated in pan-Canadian feminist organisations and observed and experienced the impact of these competing nationalisms. Our shared interest in these issues is more than academic, since we both believe conflicts over nationalism could result in diminished democracy or even civil disorder if English-Canadian women and Québécoises do not develop a clearer understanding of our roles in forming and maintaining our respective nationalisms. In Part One, then, we argue that feminists who demand equal political citizenship should accept responsibility for their nationalisms, especially if they are part of dominant or majority cultures. But this is not the view of all contributors to this volume. Vanaja Dhruvarajan and Pauline Rankin, for example, believe nationalist movements are rarely open enough to women marginalised by their race or sexuality for them to feel included or responsible. Maillé, on the other hand, believes women's feminist political agendas make male-centred, nationalist goals seem less relevant. It is not our intention to imply a uniformity of views on this or other issues. Rather, the volume demonstrates the complexity of positions and shows that there is no essential relationship among women, feminism and nationalism. Even in a single country, differently located women have different views that reflect different experiences.

One of our goals in this project as editors was to explore insights that can enhance women's understanding and mutual respect for one another as citizens in a shared polity despite often being engaged in conflicting nationalist projects. It is our thesis that relationships between feminisms and nationalisms; and between women and nations vary according to context. Identifying the elements of "context" that shape such relationships, then, is an important part of our research agenda, and identifying variables associated with gender-inclusive nationalisms is a key first step. Kiera Ladner in her analysis of women's involvement in traditional Blackfoot nationalism, for example, argues that, prior to European incursion, gender was probably irrelevant to an individual's relationship to and role in the nation. She also argues, however, that contemporary political systems of representative democracy lack the horizontal power relationships and consensual values on which this gender-inclusive nationalism rested. She notes that the traditional polity in which gender likely did not matter was undercut when colonial values were imposed. For Ladner, "context" includes political, economic, ideological and spiritual factors. Our first goal in this introduction is to begin to theorise the question of which contexts result in positive relationships for women and why. We hope to initiate a debate and research agenda that can explain the unique features of nationalisms, and of women's relationships to them, in Canada.

Our second goal is to outline the rich diversity of views about nationalism and women's citizenship expressed by the contributors. The introduction is structured so the reader may distinguish between our shared theoretical positions as editors in Part One and the diverse positions argued by the contributors explored in Part Two. It is also useful to note differences in how contributors chose to study relationships between feminisms and nationalisms and between women and nations. These differences raise valuable methodological questions about the best ways to study such relationships. Sylvia Bashevkin and Chantal Maillé, for example, focus mainly on relationships between nationalism and women as a political category. Shauna Wilton, Micheline de Sève and Jill Vickers, on the other hand, focus on relationships between women's organisations and nationalist movements or nation-building. Ladner and Dhruvarajan reject a theoretical approach that separates women from men in relation to polity or nationalisms. Micheline Dumont approaches the issues from the vantage point of writing "national history." This methodological diversity raises important questions about how best to study women's citizenship and the relationships between feminisms and nationalisms in Canada. Should such research focus primarily on women's organisations, on women as a political category, on feminist or nationalist historiography, or on women as part of other groups or collective identities, such as "people of colour" as Dhruvarajan insists? Or are different approaches needed to explore the experiences and ideas of differently located women?

The contributors also differ in their assessments of how much nationalist movements in Canada can be opened up to the involvement of women, especially women pursuing feminist goals. Most note persistent efforts by male nationalists and nation-builders to control and contain women. Most also identify circumstances in which women were part of or influenced nationalism or nation-building in ways most European scholars would describe as "extraordinary and unusual" (Kaplan 3). Why were some women able to combine feminist and nationalist politics and become involved in nation-building, but not others?

As editors, we hypothesise in Part One that aspects of Canada as a "New World" society provide a greater opportunity for some women, especially majority-culture women, to participate actively in nation-building and to combine nationalist and feminist aspirations. We also note Ladner's thesis that in pre-colonial Blackfoot nationalism, gender probably did not matter. Moreover, as Dumont, de Sève, Vickers and Bashevkin demonstrate, the context in which women experience gender-inclusive nationalisms is not fixed, but changes over time. So while English-Canadian or "Canadian" nationalisms have become increasingly closed to participation by feminists over time, Québec nationalisms have become more inclusive. Dhruvarajan reminds us that majority nationalisms, which are relatively open to white women, systematically marginalise and exclude people of colour. And Rankin observes that gays and lesbians may be excluded from one nationalist project because of their sexual orientation, but included in another.

Through these diverse insights, we learn about the variety of relationships between national and feminist goals as pursued by women, and of women's different experiences of trying to link the two goals. Moreover, we note that women's responses to inclusion or exclusion are also different. Some women choose to participate in diaspora, "queer" or anti-racist nationalisms. Others reject nationalism altogether and seek to make feminism an all-inclusive identity and politic. We also observe that English-Canadian and Québec nationalism look rather alike when seen from the perspective of those they marginalise and exclude. Our approach assumes they are both majority nationalisms, although as de Sève notes, Québécois nationalism, which has only recently become dominant in its territory, is fragile because it is a minority in Canada and North America. But in their relationships to race and ethnic minorities and to the claims of Indigenous peoples, the two majority nationalisms are similar.

Another theoretical issue is the lack of attention paid to pan-Canadian nationalism. Most contributors see Canadian nationalism as a vehicle through which English-Canadian nationalism asserts itself or they identify two, three or more nations and nationalisms within Canada. In part, this reflects the current lack of connection between feminism and pan-Canadian nationalism. Vickers argues this is because pan-Canadian nationalism is associated with neo-liberal and right-wing

movements, which are either overtly anti-feminist or delegitimize the claims of the organised feminist movement as the pleadings of "special interests." But this is a recent phenomenon. As Vickers and Bashevkin show, in the 1970s and 1980s the organised women's movement had links to the national-unity project advanced by federal Liberal governments that included bilingualism, multilingualism and an activist federal state supporting social welfare and cultural and regional redistribution programmes. In the 1990s, however, few feminists expressed attachment to Canadian nationalism. Federal governments have largely turned their backs on the main symbols of national unity, although the Charter of Rights and Freedoms remains important for most non-Québécois feminists (the Québécois are attached to the Québec Charter, which they consider better for women). These changes within the political environment make feminists less trusting of federalist pan-Canadian nationalisms.

Who are "We"?

The "we" in this text, in all of our complexity, are: Aboriginal, English Canadian and Québécoises, old immigrants and new, white and "of colour," post-colonial and still colonised, gay and heterosexual, able-bodied and with disabilities and of three generations. We are all women, but we experience our woman-ness in different ways and combine our sex/gender concerns with our nationalist or civic loyalties (or lack of them) in different ways, too. In Part Two, we the editors introduce the contributors to this volume and outline the main themes of their papers. The editors are Micheline de Sève and Jill Vickers, both professors of political science, one at the University of Québec at Montreal and one at Carleton University.

We are both feminists and nationalists, so our identities revolve around both gender and culture issues. Over years of friendship and discussion, we learned to respect and value one another's orientations. Jill learned from Micheline that the current nationalist project in Québec is an important venue and source of support for the vital and highly successful feminist movement that has transformed the lives of many women in Québec. Jill began to look at women involved in English-Canadian nationalisms and to explore whether current pan-Canadian nationalism is linked to the becalming of the women's movement in English Canada. Micheline looked at the Québec and Canadian political situations through Jill's eyes, obliging her to understand that logic was often multifaceted. She softened and enlarged her vision of what she thought were hard facts and realised that reality and truth have many faces. She also acknowledged that since the 1960s, the Québec state has become the instrument of a new, mainly francophone élite, as jealous of its power as are the anglophone élites focussed on Ottawa or the provincial capitals.

We approached this project as equals who are part of two communities that constitute majorities within Canada and so have some common experiences of nationalism. Jill recognizes that historically, French Canadians experienced attempts to assimilate, exploit and marginalise them by British Canadians and that numerically English Canadians are a majority in Canada, whereas Québécois can only be a majority in Québec. Micheline recognises the insecurity English Canadians experience *vis-à-vis* the United States, whose powerful global culture threatens them in a way it does not threaten citizens of Québec.

By exploring one another's experiences and insights, we concluded that women's ideas about nationalisms in Canada offer valuable insights into how communities with separate collective blueprints can live together not in angry silence, but in support and solidarity to enrich our existence. Yet the voices of women citizens are mostly still absent from debates about competing nationalisms. In part, this reflects exclusions of women's voices by male gatekeepers. But it also reflects the belief of many women that, because they are excluded or exclude themselves from where decisions are made, they have no responsibility for what is done in the name of "their" nationalism. While this is true when women are marginalised and excluded because of their race, ethnicity, sexual orientation or immigrant or still-colonised status, we vigorously disagree with regard to women who are part of cultural majorities. We believe abstention from political agency after decades as citizens may mask tacit consent to male-defined nationalist frameworks. That is, we believe citizenship means more than gaining rights; it also means accepting responsibility for what is done in our name.² For us, then, the flip side of women's demands for inclusion in public life is acceptance of our common civic responsibilities. But note that this view is not shared by all of the contributors. Instead it forms part of a debate we wish to initiate.

The image of women as excluded and victimised derives from and characterises Euro-American feminist scholarship on nationalism. And, indeed, the history of violent conflicts in Europe inflicted in the name of nationalism leads logically to this image. The experiences of many women in some New World "settler societies" (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis), however, have been somewhat different. In Canada, as Wilton and Vickers show, British-Canadian women's organisations participated in "nation-building," as Québécoises have in Québec long before the 1960s, as Dumont demonstrates. Like women in Asia and the Middle East early in the twentieth century, they successfully combined participation in nationalist movements with achieving feminist goals (Jayawardena). But we must not assume "women" have common experiences even within the same state.

Part One: Theorising Feminisms and Nationalisms

In this section, we explore four aspects of our theoretical framework developed over a number of years as we studied feminist efforts to understand one another's commitments (or lack of) to nationalism. "Difference" has been a major issue within feminist organisations in the past three decades. With race and sexual orientation, nationalism has figured prominently in the conflicts and fragmentation that made pan-Canadian organising a challenge. We both also research nationalism as a general theme in political science in countries outside of Canada. In addition to our experiences within Canada, therefore, we have also explored the extensive Euro-American and post-colonial literatures on nationalism. Finally, we are both influenced by, and have contributed to, the relatively new feminist scholarship on nationalism. In this section, we do not review these huge bodies of thought and debate. Each of the contributors explores some portion. Rather, the themes we present here reflect insights we gained by making connections among them. So, while we do not compare systematically different countries' experiences with nationalisms, our insights result from comparing the different contexts within which nationalisms and feminisms emerge. We are especially mindful of the problems that result when Canadian scholars theorise about Canadian experiences without a comparative framing or attempt to apply theoretical constructs developed elsewhere.

We begin with a critique of the applications of dominant Euro-American theories of nationalism that focus on the misleading and ideological civic-ethnic dichotomy. We argue that we must make the experiences of Canada (and potentially other New World settler societies) if we are to proceed beyond the field's current conceptual inadequacies. Third, we theorise the importance of focussing on the sex-gender dimension of nationalisms, beginning with revelations from feminist debates about whether nationalism is good or bad for women. Finally, we suggest four conceptual shifts that may be necessary to comprehend fully women's experiences with nationalisms in Canada.

Critiques of Euro-American Theories of Nationalism

The idea that the nation-state form is natural is increasingly in doubt as globalisation points to more multinational states and increases cultural diversity within nation-states. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a failure, and the European Community does not threaten yet the sovereign-nation-state norm is the standard aim of modern theories of successful political systems. Most Euro-American political thinkers – Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, J.S. Mill, Jefferson – assumed cultural and linguistic homogeneity was required for a successful modern state. This is what nation-state implies when Ernest Gellner bluntly states that in each state monogamy must prevail between the dominant high culture (repressing or eliminating other

cultures and languages) and its political incarnation. The "national" unity of modern, homogenised, industrial, civil societies is theorised as necessary for the harmonious development of powerful, integrated cultural units. Civic nationalisms, in which dominant élites build a nationalism associated with the institutions of a secularised state and tolerate only privatised differences, are thus privileged. In this context, in a democracy, individual citizens may be equal, although some must renounce public expression of their particular characteristics (female gender, language, faith, sexual orientation and so on) to join in the communion of values around the dominant civic culture. A hierarchy ensues in the relative positions between male and female, straight and gay, and among racialised and ethnicised members of national minorities or immigrant groups and luckier citizens whose cultural traits comprise the common civic culture. Most Euro-American theorists of nationalism and the nation-state argue such hierarchies are required by the transition to modern urban societies. They also assert that such societies must be unified around one public code and one system of education. Members of the majority culture, however, forget that the dominant status of their culture represses any plural and truly common civic culture.³

The private-public split is at the heart of Euro-American theories of nationalism. This political device demarks a common civic public. It relegates expressions of difference, including non-dominant languages, cultures and religions, to the private sphere and comprises the frontier of male public space from which women historically were excluded. It also maintains the fallacy of equal civic rights for men and women of social groups differentiated along class, race, ethnic and religious lines. Feminist theories reveal the effects of gender differences on the ostensibly neutral cultural kitbag that makes up the so-called civic ruling code supposedly applied universally to each and every citizen. Women's claims to full, substantive citizenship, in particular, expose the false universalism of purportedly democratic regimes blind to how women's labour permit men a larger freedom to participate in decision-making and deliberating about the public good. Democracy is increasingly criticised for its failure to bring parity of representation between men and women as, for example, in the debates about a new women-aware model advanced by feminists in France and the European Community and about the "democratic deficit."

The struggle for citizenship models that explicitly recognise women's specificity is one dimension of a more general movement towards public recognition of cultural differences now fully on the agenda in Europe although repressed in the United States. The goal is a democracy that works asymmetrically for specific groups of citizens dealing with different life experiences based on an understanding of citizen's equality as something more than the same treatment of individuals. This issue is faced anew, for example, in building a common European public space open to

the demands of central and southern European countries, including those emerging from under proletarian internationalism. Europe is rediscovering that it is made up not only of what Gellner labels "high" cultures but also of many lively and resilient vernacular cultures that resist attempts to submerge their specific collective identities under unitary labels. Restructuring democracy around public recognition of plural collective identities is becoming a central issue in a European club confronting both unexpected candidates for membership and the re-emergence of collective identities as in Corsica, Catalonia, the Pays basque or Scotland, within nation-states. Yet few European theorists of nationalism have recognised the challenge of these dynamic political changes or the centrality of sex-gender dynamics to the dominant theories of nationalism and the nation-state.

Globalisation increasingly makes the planet a common economic and political arena, although the centuries-old conflict between the Muslim "East" and the Christian "West" has re-emerged as a brake. Democratic nationalisms, in which women combine activism as feminists and nationalists, and violent, misogynist nationalisms, which forcibly exclude them, except as controlled reproducers, have emerged. Nations are asserting themselves as public utilities in this enlarged public sphere in which democracy is very much at stake. Many women aspire to be fully autonomous political subjects in the democratic nationalist movements because they link individual empowerment to their community's ability to create or sustain collective vehicles to make their participation optimally effective. Nationalism can take on the democratic face of non-violent social movements looking for cultural as well as political recognition in a pluralistic polity. Moreover, one mark of democratic nationalisms is the active participation in them of women as agents. Bloody episodes of ethnic cleansing as in Kosovo and other parts of ex-Yugoslavia remind us of the dark, anti-democratic forms nationalist movements can take. But the tendency in Euro-American theories to label such manifestations "ethnic" nationalisms – thus assuming all attempts to make national claims are guilty by association – is problematic. We must resist the temptation to reject the legitimacy of national claims for recognition, just as we must resist the temptation to reject democracy because of its sexist and racist base. Note that three major characteristics of violent, excluding forms of nationalism are their rejection of democracy, the lack of women in their leadership groups and their use of politically inspired mass rapes of women as an instrument of national conflict. It is not difficult, therefore, to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic forms of nationalism.

The ideological contest set up by the false dichotomy between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalisms fails to recognise that some civic (state-created) nationalisms are violent, undemocratic and oppressive for women, whereas, some ethnic (cultural) nationalisms are peaceful, democratic and woman-friendly. By examining the roles

of women in the civic and ethnic variants, therefore, we reveal the shortcomings of this theoretical (really ideological) dichotomy.

Women's claims for respect for the diversity of their gender and sexual orientation must inspire respect for the many diverse communities that comprise the richness of the global world population. Theoretical imagination is needed to devise better ways of dealing with our plural identities than the male-centred, one-nation/one-state polities in which we now struggle. And, as Hannah Arendt argues, the more people experience democracy, the more individuals and communities strive to be self-governing, at least to some degree. Political maturity is about autonomous decision-making in a world of interrelated nations, not necessarily absolute independence.

Why Focus on Canada? Nationalisms in Settler Societies

Nation-building in Canada never really fit the model basic to Euro-American theories of nationalism. The facts surrounding the country's birth and growth made the imposition of a single, common national identity mostly impossible, although much effort was expended on the project by British-Canadian élites. John Ralston Saul argues that, despite the "affectation, dear to Canadians, that they are more European than the Americans to our south.... Canada is profoundly un-European [because its] circumstances moved us away from the European model of the monolithic frontier-conquering nation-state" (102). He asserts that our collective experiences are quite different from those of Europe and of the United States, which "is the natural prolongation of the European idea ... the European state personified" (*Ibid.*).

Canada's experiences as a federal state, built through competitive colonialism and a determination to use state power to supplant the Indigenous nations already in place, seem on the surface similar to American experiences. Ralston Saul argues that Canada poses a totally new context for understanding nationalism as both a political and a cultural phenomenon. European Canadians did not rebel against our colonial parents (as people did in the United States), nor did we conceive of our nationhood as a universal form, like Americanism, which élites in the United States used to justify a doctrine of manifest destiny first regarding a continent and then *vis-à-vis* the world. None the less, Ralston Saul's thesis must be modified to recognise the similarities between white Canadians of British and French heritage and Americans with regard to their assumed manifest destiny over the Indigenous peoples they displaced, over slaves, over women and over the non-British immigrants, whose labour was central to their nation-building projects. Canadian history combines similarities *and* differences.

First in separate colonies and then in a fragile federation, British Canadians struggled to create a classic, European-style nation-state in the northern half of the

continent, recruiting many British-Canadian women, as Wilton and Vickers describe. Following the Euro-American doctrine that each state needs the cohesion of one nationalism, moreover, they sought to eliminate competing and subordinate cultures and to recruit those immigrants considered assimilable into the new English Canada they determined to create. (They also operated a thinly disguised "white Canada" policy, which admitted non-whites as workers. Those workers were then denied the rights of citizenship until after the Second World War.) They failed in their efforts to recreate Britain in North America for two reasons. First, because French Canada was large enough and too resilient to be assimilated, thanks to constitutional protection of its distinctiveness as a society (civil code, language rights and so on). Second, because it controlled a partial state in Québec, through which it could defend many of its interests. In the process, an unequal partnership emerged between British-Canadian élites and part of the French-Canadian élite. The compact theory of Canada, which originated in "Old Canada" prior to Confederation, reflected the existence of internal colonialism – Indigenous peoples under the *Indian Act*; and western and northern territories ("New Canada") without provincial status. The dominant Ontario/Québec partnership's civic nationalism, based on élite accommodation, has been eroded by democratisation, provincial resistance along cultural and ideological lines and assertion of the internal colonised nations. Moreover, the transition since the 1960s from a pan-Canadian, two-nations partnership to a modern, Québec-based nationalism left francophones outside Québec vulnerable minorities reliant on federal institutions for protection. What was successfully created was an English Canada composed of Canadians of British origins and the English-speaking white ethnics they assimilated in the early decades of the twentieth century. By the 1960s and 1970s, moreover, the white ethnics had gained enough clout to extract a multicultural policy from the federal government.

The failure to build a durable European or American-style single civic nationalism created space for the survival or revival of other collective identities, which are now expressed in a democratic discourse of multiple nationalisms to which women contribute important voices. In a world of nation-states, in which it is assumed each state works by having a single, shared identity (ethnic nations) or by creating one (civic nations), scrutiny of Canada's "dilemma" has focussed mostly on Québec nationalism. Many see Québec's desire for self-government beyond what a federation provides as an historical anomaly. These people ask, "Why break up one of the best countries in the world in which to live?" A closer look at why the one-state/one-nation project failed in Canada reveals new insights into how peoples with diverse collective identities can live together in the same state and territory, although not without tension and potential conflict. Some insights are tragic; others involve exciting new visions, as when old institutional channels for regulating conflict fail, revealing repressed differences and allowing

difference to emerge as the norm. This suggests that Canada's "failure" to create a durable, one-state/one-nation form may be the basis for replacing the classic nation-state form, with its propensity for violence, with competing democratic forms.

The classic nationality doctrine that prescribes a single, pan-Canadian nationalism, none the less, remains a potent force for many Canadians, expressed in present-day nationalisms reacting against globalisation and diversity, as Bashevkin and Vickers illustrate. But other Canadians, including many feminists, believe respect for cultural diversity and a desire for democratic self-government are here to stay and that globalisation will promote them even more in the new millennium. New visions by Canadian political philosophers' of a multinational state (Taylor, Gully, Ralston Saul), Québec's "*péquist*e" vision of sovereignty association, or NAC's⁴ vision of "three nations," moreover, suggest that an acceptance of diversity is a source of creativity rather than something to fear. The project of creating Canada as a democracy composed of an association of self-governing communities and nations based on respect for both collective and individual rights, moreover, is different from visions of a globalised world with powerful trans-national agencies dominating individuals who consume homogenised, de-nationalised cultural products. Although we provide no road-map for re-constituting Canada, the increased involvement of women in their respective nationalisms can promote the goal of a more diversity-friendly polity.

How did the Canadian context affect women's relationships to nation-building and nationalism? Colonial British-Canadian and French-Canadian nationalisms struggling with one another were explicitly racist to different degrees as the competing European-origin nations sought to legitimise their supplanting of the Indigenous nations and confederacies. In Europe, nationalisms were primarily male-led movements to create culturally homogeneous states on the nationalist one-state/one-nation doctrine. In Canada, however, as Wilton and Vickers illustrate, British-Canadian women participated actively in supplanting Indigenous nations through conversion and education and in "civilising" and "Canadianising" non-British immigrants. Their role in making other people become English-speaking and respectful of British-origin institutions and values legitimised their claims to citizenship, which, as in New Zealand, Australia and the western United States, were successful earlier than in Europe or Britain, arguably because of their involvement in nation-building.

Canada's experiences also differ from the course of nationalisms in the United States and Latin America. Benedict Anderson asserts that the origins of modern nationalism lie in the reaction of Creole communities in the 13 British colonies and in Latin American colonies when whites born in the Americas experienced exclusion from colonial power imposed by European-born men with whom they shared

cultures and languages. Anderson's theory points to two different contexts in which nationalisms emerged in New World settler societies. First is the case of the United States and Latin American states, which rebelled early and successfully from their European parents and then imitated them by repressing difference within the new settler states through purportedly civic nationalisms, which usually excluded both non-whites and women from citizenship. The second case is represented by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which did not rebel (or tried to but failed) and constructed societies that gained their autonomy slowly. They gained consolidation of the new settler states by combining broadly based white democracies with early citizenship for white women and some form of apartheid, segregation and internal colonialism over Indigenous peoples and exclusion of non-white prospective immigrants. This case constitutes a different context for understanding nationalisms than where revolutionary regimes successfully imposed and normalised homogeneity within a new nation-state.

In Canada, unsuccessful rebellions occurred in 1836-1838 in Upper and Lower Canada and later in the Northwest Territories. But British-Canadian efforts to eliminate the First Nations and Métis and to assimilate francophones ultimately failed, as these internal nations now seek self-government or sovereignty. The establishment of a federal system in which education – everywhere else the key tool of nation-building – was controlled by the provinces and with a constitutional regime that recognise some collective rights and a different civil code for Québec, reflected this complex history.⁵

In the late twentieth century, nationalism was again the discourse used by First Nations peoples and francophones in Québec seeking political autonomy and self-government. Moreover, as Ladner argues, we are seeing the re-emergence of authentic Indigenous nationalisms (not simply social movements using the name) and a new wave of pan-Indian nationalism. De Sève demonstrates that a modernising Québec nationalism faces many of the same dilemmas as Canada faces. In both cases, nationalisms are competing, mostly through peaceful, political means, and many women are active participants. Moreover, several questions arise about the links between democratic nationalisms and women's participation as citizens. Are nationalisms more likely to be peaceful and democratic when women are involved in them? Under what circumstances do women participate as agents in nationalist movements? Finally, under what circumstances can women combine feminist and nationalist goals?

Why Focus on Women?

Our focus on women citizens' experiences with nationalisms results in what some may perceive as the relative neglect of men. Since this issue demonstrates the significance of context in explaining the varying relationships between feminisms and nationalisms and between women and nation-building, it follows that men's relationships with nationalisms also vary. The traditional discourse, however, generally assumes gender need not be problematised because nationalisms are unisex and so gender is deemed irrelevant to citizenship and nation-building and to the power relationships they represent. Most feminist scholars of nationalism contest that premise. So, while we acknowledge that men's relationships with nationalisms and their political power vary, we also assume that the democratic polities and nationalist movements women in Canada and elsewhere currently engage with are patriarchal in character; that is, they are characterised by systematic male-dominance, although to varying degrees.⁶ Consequently, feminist scholars assert that citizenship and nationalisms are gendered, in that men and women experience them differently and form two political categories – those who dominate political institutions and those who do not.

We do not argue that male dominance of democratic polities and nationalisms is inevitable or total. Indeed, it is our thesis that there is no essential relationship between gender and nation. Even when a polity is male-dominated, women may participate in creating and maintaining nationalisms as citizens, as Wilton, de Sève, Vickers and Bashevkin show. While this may not seem like a radical thesis to Canadians, in Europe women's experiences with nationalisms have been mostly negative and their roles often restricted to being controlled reproducers and symbolisers of national honour. In the Euro-American literature, therefore, it is assumed that nationalism and feminism are incompatible ideologies. Gisela Kaplan, for example, notes: "So extraordinary is the alliance between feminism and nationalism in Europe that I was able to find only two examples..." (3). By contrast, feminism and nationalism have combined in more than one context in Canada and in modernising, post-colonial states.

We do not assume there is a single "women's position" regarding experiences with nationalisms. We think women's relationships with nationalisms are diverse within a state as well as between states. Women's relationships to nationalisms currently reflect the patriarchal character of their polities and societies, for example, but Ladner's account of gender-inclusive traditional Blackfoot nationalism warns us not to universalise or essentialise our current sense that women suffer because of how our society constructs gender. Women's roles in physically and culturally reproducing collective identities can be a source of power for some women. For British-Canadian women, for example, their "woman-ness" made them invaluable allies in nation-building. More recently, Québec feminism emerged virtually

twinning with the new nationalism, which gave Québec feminists the opportunity to construct their citizenship containing both.

Most feminist scholarship on nationalism views it as “bad for women” because it focusses on nationalist movements and on official state nationalisms, which exclude women, treat them as dependent and controlled reproducers and embroil them in war and rape as an instrument of communal conflict. English-Canadian and, later, franco-Québec women, by contrast, were able at times to create political space within nationalist movements and to use their involvement to achieve feminist goals.⁷ Wilton’s concept of maternal nationalism and Lois West’s theory and identification of feminist nationalist social movements must be read in this context. Even in patriarchal movements and politics, some women play active roles in nation-building and can combine feminism with nationalism.

Women of colour and lesbians often have quite different experiences than women of the majority cultures within a state and so face exclusion and negative depictions of their identities by majority nationalisms. But they may simultaneously experience agency by becoming involved in anti-racist or diaspora nationalisms or in movements like Queer Nation, as Rankin describes. As women, we may share some experiences of marginalisation, exclusion or oppression. But we also differ in our relationships with collective identities, including nationalisms. For example, the contributors to this issue do not all name themselves feminists, because that term has been associated with movements dominated by white women of the majority cultures. Several follow Black women and call themselves “womanists,” for example, a term popularised by Alice Walker. That is, the differences in our experiences of exclusion, marginalisation or oppression because of our race, language, culture, disability or sexual orientation may outweigh the similarities of our experiences as women. Reflecting on how minority and marginalised women’s experiences differ, therefore, leads us to focus on links such as those between nationalism and colonialism. As women, we have fresh insights about collective identities and their importance to our shared humanity, especially in a global age. For example, because women everywhere must struggle against private and public violence, we are especially aware of the potential of nationalisms to legitimise violence and oppression. This underlies our responsibility as citizens to resist nationalisms based on the violent exclusion of other people. Not all nationalisms are violent, however, and women’s involvements have been primarily in non-violent, democratic nationalisms. An important research question, therefore, is whether women’s participation in democratic nationalisms affects the propensity for violence of those nationalisms; or if all nationalisms must be suspected of having a propensity to violent exclusion if women are involved or not.

We turn to the question – central to feminist debates about nationalism – of whether non-excluding, outward-looking nationalisms that act without violence

are possible. Some feminists see women as natural peacemakers, yet reject nationalisms as bad for women because they assume the nationalisms have an essential propensity for violent exclusion. These feminists are usually members of majority cultures, however, whose identities are safely preserved through the institutions and media that define the contours of the public realm; that is, the dominant cultures in control of nation-states. Such women can afford non-violence and stand-alone feminism that focusses exclusively on sex/gender oppression. For women whose identities are nurtured by collectivities supplanted, marginalised or repressed by powerful, dominant cultures, however, the picture is different. For them, assimilation into the patriotic spaces of nation-states involves loss of identity, language and values every bit as much as it does for their menfolk. Advocates of stand-alone feminism are often members of dominant cultures who expect other women to focus solely on gender issues. They reject nationalism and see women who are nationalists as manipulated by men, as if only men had collective identities to defend. This kind of feminism must be acknowledged as assimilationist in effect, if not always in intent. Women who are part of a dominant culture may not perceive it as a nationalism at all. Women excluded from dominant nationalisms, however, theorise links among race, gender, ethnicity and nation differently.

Feminist Debates About Nationalisms

In this section, we outline the Euro-American women's views of nationalism associated with stand-alone feminism or what Chandra Mohanty calls hegemonic feminism (36). The subject in hegemonic feminism is an individual – autonomous, self-determining and self-defining. Moreover, only individual equality and autonomy – defined as control over an individual woman's life-choices, body and sexuality – are seen as feminist goals, and so significant in measuring the status of women. Ironically, most Euro-American feminist accounts of nationalism also paint women as controlled and manipulated symbols and reproducers *vis-à-vis* nationalist movements. Western feminists also note that male nationalists frequently condemn feminism as divisive to the solidarity of their movements (see, for example, McClintock). But many western stand-alone feminists also view women as manipulated and duped by nationalist leaders, then discarded after independence or national consolidation without lasting gains for women. Other women's desire for national liberation is not understood as a feminist goal, and women who link their goals to the aspirations of their community or nation are viewed as less feminist or even un-feminist. Liberal individualism, which underlies most western feminism, constructs a feminist subject who does not need nationalism and fears its threat to her individualism and autonomy because nationalism draws her into a collectivity. Many Euro-American feminists, moreover,

ignore their own context within nation-state majorities that subordinate non-majority peoples and internal nations and, through colonialism and neo-colonialism, dominate others politically, economically and culturally.

Many feminist scholars of nationalism argue that nationalism is bad for most women (Pettman; Yuval-Davis; Essed; Moghadam; Morgan; Enloe). A close assessment of women's gains in association with different nationalist movements, however, reveals a more nuanced picture. Kumari Jayawardena, for example, demonstrates that positive relationships existed between modernising, anti-colonial, nationalist movements and feminist movements in many Asian and Middle-Eastern countries from the end of the nineteenth century until after the Second World War. West identifies feminist nationalist movements in the Philippines, allied with Indigenous Hawaiian nationalism and in contemporary Québec. Both writers demonstrate that women often made long-lasting gains. (In some circumstances, however, the gains were short-lived, most notoriously in Algeria.) The prominence of women in politics in the democratic states of Asia, however, can be traced in part to women's involvements in nationalist projects. Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury argue, on the basis of 43 country studies, that opportunities for women to work for feminist goals within nationalist movements vary over time and with the type of nationalism. They distinguish between modernising nationalisms, in which women, especially in Asia and Latin America, have found political space for feminist projects; and anti-modern nationalisms, which have emerged in alliance with Islamic fundamentalism in some Middle-Eastern and North African countries and in some post-Communist regimes, which are intensely misogynist and, in their ideologies, explicitly reject feminist goals associated with western modernity or Communism.

A careful assessment suggests we need a contextual approach that theorises different relationships between feminisms and nationalisms from mutually supportive to oppressive; and different relationships between women and nation-building from excluded to active participants. While the construction of a conceptual typology is beyond the scope of this Introduction, it would have to include both feminisms and nationalisms as they change over time and place and look within states at both official nationalisms and hegemonic feminisms, as well as marginalised and oppositional forms of each.

Are Conceptual Shifts Needed?

Four basic theoretical observations emerge from our analysis as editors. First, most current mainstream debates about nationalism in Canada ignore women's varied experiences, especially their active participation in democratic nationalisms and in nation-building. Although, as Dumont shows, feminist historians have explored a number of the issues raised by the relationships between gender and nation, such gendered insights have not been incorporated into general political or theoretical

discourses. Second, current debates tend to revolve around the ethnic versus civic construct, which is generally used normatively to label official civic nationalisms as peaceful, good and mature, while cultural nationalisms are pejoratively labelled ethnic and viewed as bad, dangerous and immature. This occurs while denying the ethnic origins and values underlying so-called civic nationalisms and their institutions, which Wilton, Vickers and de Sève demonstrate; and while ignoring the peaceful, democratic character of many cultural nationalisms such as those in Catalonia, Scotland and Québec. (Current debate also ignores the propensity to violence of many official civic nationalisms either while nation-building or in imperialist ventures.) Third, there may well be a link between the neglect of women's participation in nationalisms and the daemonisation of even democratic cultural nationalist projects as "ethnic." That is, most debates about nationalisms ignore the democratic intent of many claims to sovereignty or self-government, just as they neglect the actual and potential power of women citizens to shape nationalisms and other collective political and cultural projects. Finally, because feminist literature on nationalism, citizenship and democracy relies heavily on Western European and on white American women's experiences, it assumes the naturalness of social homogeneity within a nation (as in stand-alone feminism), which does not correspond to the realities of nationalisms or feminisms in Canada or any other multinational state.

These points suggest that understanding nationalisms and nation-building in Canada and in other New World states may require some conceptual shifts. In the texts that follow, some of these conceptual shifts are already evident; others are not. As editors, we are persuaded that women's experiences with nationalisms and nation-building in Canada are sufficiently distinct from those of Euro-American women that new ways of thinking about them may be needed. In the next section, we outline four possible conceptual shifts we think will generate a research agenda better focussed on Canadian experiences with nationalisms and nation-building. By treating Canadian experiences with nation-building and nationalism as the main business, we believe we can refocus debates within Canada and contribute fresh insights to general theories of nationalism and to the feminist gender and nation scholarship.

Adopting a "New World" Focus

The first conceptual shift we see as desirable is *away from* Western Europe as the sole centre of theorising about nationalisms *to* many diverse experiences in different parts of the world, including Canada. The dominant literature is based theoretically on the general belief that "[n]ationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe" (Kedourie 9) or in reaction to European imperialism. Ladner rejects this premise and argues that nationalisms, including pre-colonial Indigenous nationalisms, have a number

of different origins.⁸ Clearly, white Canadians have been influenced by European ideas and experiences, but a shift to focus on New World nationalisms in their own right is important regarding the debates about whether First Nations are really nations or if the nationality doctrine is compatible with a multinational or even an asymmetrical federal state. Locating Canada and ultimately other New World states at the centre allows us to consider theoretical constructs little explored in Euro-America literature, such as Indigenous nationalisms, multinational states, maternal nationalisms and sovereignty association. Our theorising must be relational: first, to reveal relationships between and among European colonizers and the white settlements they planted in Canada; and second, to explore the complex relationships among colonial powers, settler nations, Indigenous nations and immigrant and diaspora nationalisms. The shift may also focus our attention on democratic competition among multiple nationalisms and on the desire of culturally distinct peoples for some measure of autonomy and self-government, although not necessarily for absolute sovereignty.

Decentring American Experience

A second conceptual shift which is probably needed: to displace the United States experience as the only exemplar of New World nationalisms. As Ralston Saul argues, US nationalism – with its claims of manifest destiny and its statement that “American” democracy ought to be a universal form – is quite different from Canadian nationalism. Culturally and politically, the United States saw itself as the first new nation. Born at the height of the European Enlightenment, “the United States embraced the full rationality of the nation-state project as it had been unfolding from Machiavelli to Cromwell and Richelieu...” (Ralston Saul 103). Ralston Saul concludes that “[f]rom the first moment of its birth, the United States embraced the full rationality of the nation-state project,” adopting the Enlightenment ideal in its concepts of the melting pot and manifest destiny as it created an aggressive civic nationalism – Americanism – through internal colonialism, a civil war, slavery, segregation and an assimilationist melting pot. Ralston Saul argues that Canadians developed a different model of a nation, which involved “a more complex accommodation with place and circumstance” (104); “a nation conceived as existing in permanent motion; more a sensibility than an ambition” (107).

White women’s involvement in Americanism also influenced US feminists, and they often failed to see American nationalism behind their account of what “universal woman’s liberation” should be like. This confusion of American nationalism with universalism led to ideas like global sisterhood, which ignored the diverse feminisms and womanisms in the world. The American experience of believing you are at the centre of the world and the exemplar of progress and modernity was not shared in sparsely populated, relatively unimportant Canada,

whose asymmetrical federal character increasingly makes us aware we are members of one nation among many within our country, as well as in the world. None the less, the American form of undifferentiated, stand-alone feminism did influence English-Canadian feminists, as de Sève demonstrates.

Anderson argued that nationalism had its first expression in the experiences of Creole settlers in the early American and Latin American states, in colonies where white settlers rebelled and created one form of New World nationalism.⁹ There is another New World pattern, however, formed of settler societies like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which did not create new nationalisms based on masculinised rebellion. Instead, like dutiful daughters, these countries experienced prolonged adolescence and developed colonial nationalisms (see Vickers; Wilton) based on an interweaving of continuity and autonomy rather than on a radical break.

Decentring Male Experiences

The third conceptual shift made by many, but not all, of the contributors is away from an undifferentiated, universalist perspective, focussed on (heterosexual) men's experiences, to exploring nationalisms from diverse perspectives including women-centred. In some cases, this involves a systematic re-interpretation of our understandings about nationalism, especially when we link nationalisms to majority women's pursuit of citizenship and democracy. Unlike women's experiences with most European nationalisms, Wilton's concept of maternal nationalism, for example, captures the joint advocacy of feminism and nationalism by British-Canadian women in Manitoba in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Dumont and de Sève note that, while French-Canadian nationalisms were not always woman-friendly, politics after the Quiet Revolution led many Québécoises to see feminism and nationalism as inter-linked democratic movements for self-government.¹⁰ As Bashevkin and de Sève conclude, globalisation makes nation-states fragile. As well, women increasingly realise that asserting their specific cultures is crucial if they are to avoid losing their hard-won positions in their civil societies as power relationships shift.

Most contributors to this volume are generally critical of the classic nationalist doctrine, but they support nationalisms that are democratic movements within which women can aspire to full citizenship. Contributors do not generally interpret the word "democracy" only in terms of individualism and majority rule. Instead, there is a willingness to consider the role of collective rights in providing a necessary environment for women's personal growth, provided that minority nations, peoples and communities also have the right to be different and self-governing to some degree. As editors, we stress women's right to participate in developing mature, pluralist forms of democracy that can respect and promote difference, instead of repressing it. But we are also aware of the profound difficulties of crafting nationalisms that can truly

include people who are different from the majority. Although some Québec nationalists envision Québec as a totally autonomous, free-standing entity with a homogeneous identity, the Québécoises writing in this text are more conscious of the presence, within Québec, of other entities with valid claims to diversity, inclusion and self-government. Inside "Canada," there are a number of other identities struggling for expression, respect and autonomy.

Unlike Euro-American feminist literature, which mostly considers nationalism bad for women, the contributors identify both positive and negative relationships between women and nationalisms, especially between majority-culture feminist movements and democratic nationalisms. As Dhruvarajan reminds us, however, whether or not a nationalism is democratic is of small consequence for those whose communities are and always will be minorities if democracy is interpreted narrowly as competitive, representative political institutions in which majorities rule. Dhruvarajan argues that most women of colour cannot see themselves in the democratic nationalisms their sisters at some stages helped build. Their children, born in Canada, wish to be accepted but are often rejected because their physical differences or accents set them apart from the English-Canadian or Québec nations. ("But where are you from, really?") Women now contribute to democratic processes, but many are aware that democracy as a procedural device is compatible with racism, sexism, homophobia and colonialism.

Finding Space for Race

The fourth conceptual shift we believe is needed is to an explicit focus on interactions between nationalisms and racism, especially where new settler states rest on colonial race-regimes that dispossessed, exploited, oppressed and excluded those not categorised as white. What the dominant New World nationalisms share is that they were developed to reinforce race-regimes in which white settlers enjoyed citizenship rights denied to the supplanted Indigenous inhabitants and to the non-European peoples imported to do the material work of nation-building.

Majority nationalisms have generally ignored this phenomenon; indeed, English-Canadian nationalism has differentiated itself from the United States through the myth that we treated our Indians better than the United States did. Ladner's and Dhruvarajan's texts suggest we must explore these elements of nation-building. We must also examine white women's involvement in nation-building more thoroughly to understand nationalisms in Canada. A women-centred lens is not sufficient unless it acknowledges the interrelationships among colonialism, racism, sexism and nationalism. White women, including feminists, often have not recognised the privileges their race and origins confer and have stressed women's relative lack of power *vis-à-vis* nationalist movements. Our conceptual shifts suggest a greater emphasis on women's agency.

Part Two: Overview of the Texts

In this section, we draw out insights from the contributors, who work from a number of different perspectives. We proceed in the order the articles appear in the text and introduce each contributor with her text.

The volume begins with an account of traditional Blackfoot nationalism by Kiera Ladner, a PhD candidate in political science at Carleton University and a woman of Plains Cree and German descent. Ladner's main goal is to demonstrate that Native nationalisms were, and are, nationalisms in their own right, separate from western Eurocentric experience. She asserts that traditional Indigenous Blackfoot nationalism was different in character from that specified as normative in the dominant western-European paradigm, and was not simply a colonial era or post-colonial reaction to European nation-state colonialism. Her approach is to gain an understanding of pre-colonial Blackfoot nationalism based on written accounts and on the teachings of Blackfoot Elders, who through their oral traditions retain understandings of this nationalism. She contrasts traditional Blackfoot nationalism with contemporary syncretic nationalisms and pan-Indian movements. She also challenges the contention of some white scholars that traditionally Indigenous peoples had no nations and that Indigenous nationalisms are merely social movements using the term and projecting a concept borrowed from Europe back in time.

Ladner argues that gender probably did not matter in traditional Blackfoot nationalism, with its open conception of membership in which a shared cultural, political and spiritual identity created a shared sense of nationhood. Women were full members of society and could choose their own path in life. They could be political and spiritual leaders or warriors and hunters, "manly-hearted women." She hypothesises that, because the Blackfoot had no coercive authorities to restrict individuals, they needed a strong sense of responsibility to the collective to counter-balance their radical freedom. Individuals were free to do as they chose, regardless of their gender, in a system based on self-rule and collective decision-making through consensus.

This "alterNative vision" of nationalism is significant because it illustrates a nationalism that valued diversity and did not impose homogeneity. Ladner's powerful account of gender-inclusive nationalism is balanced by her assessment of the impact of colonialism on Blackfoot nationalism and her conclusion that gender probably does matter in contemporary, renewed, Indigenous nationalisms. She notes that colonial nationalists manipulated images of Aboriginal women to symbolise the purported shortcomings of Aboriginal societies.¹¹ She implies that contemporary feminists incorporate such images when they view Indigenous women as victims, and fail to understand that the gendered division of labour in Blackfoot society did not entail the inequality subordination or oppression of

women, who were powerful, honoured and respected whatever role they chose. The fluid system of sex-role differentiation meant women could participate as producers of nationalism in any role. European gender categories miss this point, she asserts, and therefore fail to grasp the possibility of an inclusive nationalism based on respect for diversity and an inclusive society.

A vision of an inclusive nation and nationalism is evident in Micheline de Sève's text. She explores the difficulties of integrating diversity in both the pan-Canadian and Québec feminist movements. Stressing the intense connection between the emergence of "womanism" and nationalism for many Québécoises, she explores the difficulty Canadian feminists had in understanding the difference between themselves and those they assumed shared a commitment to a strong federal state. Many English-Canadian feminists assumed democratic nationalism in Québec was an ethnic nationalism, which they had been taught was prone to violence and likely to oppress women. De Sève criticises the Canadian feminist movement's difficulty in comprehending difference, and describes how it learned its claim to represent Canadian women was illegitimate, as Québécoises sought to represent themselves. She argues that it has become normal for the Québec and English-Canadian movements to find they sometimes disagree on issues, although this does not preclude *ad hoc* coalitions when common issues are at stake. She also notes that different women's movements have become jealous of their respective autonomy, and are fragmented, so as to preclude a political perspective based on "unity-in-difference." So while she perceives some beginning capacity to deal with diversity, about the future she is only cautiously optimistic.

Micheline Dumont, retired professor of history at the University of Sherbrooke, provides an important historical understanding of the changing relationships between the national idea and women's agency. In assessing the stormy relationship between nationalism and feminism, she asserts that radical feminism was born of modern nationalism. She looks at the relationship from inside the Québec nationalist movement, and is critical because René Lévesque and other Parti Québécois leaders failed to translate their "favourable prejudice toward women" (as written in their programme) into effective strategies. She recalls how women activists felt estranged by political manoeuvres aimed at winning votes. The need to win votes was seen as sufficient reason to postpone or repudiate feminist demands.

Dumont concludes that historiography about feminism and nationalism naturalises women and presents only men as the subjects of Québec national history. This leads her to ask, "Can nationalism include feminist concerns?" Despite the evidence she presents, she does not repudiate nationalism. She concludes with a quotation by Cynthia Enloe: "Living as a nationalist is one of the most difficult projects in today's world."

Chantal Maillé, political scientist and ex-principal of the Simone de Beauvoir Institute of Women's Studies at Concordia University, discusses why some women may be less interested than some men in nationalist and constitutional debates. Based on her 1997 survey, she explores what the media discovered as "the gender gap" concerning support for sovereignty. Drawing on her analysis of a sample of 1,073 respondents, she suggests that, whatever their partisan allegiance, women's down-to-earth agendas focus on their most urgent, every-day needs. Many women's political energies may be less attracted to abstract, theoretical causes. But, Maillé warns, we must not universalise the category "women" because women's relationships with the polity and with nationalism are complex and diverse.

Maillé also outlines how Québec politicians constructed the idea of women as a special political clientele to be wooed for the oui or for the non. She challenges the idea that men and women are opposing electoral categories concerning nationalism; however, she concludes that there is no such thing as a "women's vote" and that different groups of women and men had varied reasons for supporting or not supporting sovereignty. In Maillé's subtle analysis we must reject totalising, essentialising analyses of "women's" political views about democratic nationalisms, in Québec or elsewhere. Regarding Québec women's relationships to feminism and nationalism, Maillé concludes it is better not to strive for an overarching theory. We must be content with partial, small-scale explanations about the political behaviours of particular groups of women.

Three contributors write about women's involvements in Canadian, British-Canadian and English-Canadian nationalisms at different times. Sylvia Bashevkin, professor of political science at the University of Toronto, addresses women's involvement in current English-Canadian (defined as anti-American) nationalism. Shauna Wilton, a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Alberta, describes and theorises the "maternal nationalism" developed by British-origin women through the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire (IODE) in Manitoba in the early decades of the twentieth century. Jill Vickers explores British- and English-Canadian women's involvements in the construction of "Canadian" nationalisms at four times during the twentieth century.

Nationalism in Canada is usually constructed as a problem for national unity because of Québec's desire for self-government, which is often represented as a dangerous ethnic nationalism bent on fracturing of the Canadian nation-state, which many English Canadians perceive to be a benign, inclusive, civic nationalism. These three texts focus on the complex nationalisms of those Canadians who are part of ROC (the rest of Canada), apart from Québec and Indigenous nationalisms.

Writing mainly about the last decade, Bashevkin defines English-Canadian nationalism as "the organized pursuit of greater cultural and economic independence from the United States." Her core argument is that since the introduction of

free trade, English-Canadian nationalism has become increasingly weak and embattled, partly because of the declining influence of its new social-movement allies, including the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). She argues that this fragile, left-of-centre nationalism was disadvantaged by its dependency on allies like NAC because the rise of alternate identities undermined the homogenous English-Canadian in-group. She concludes that activists promoting English-Canadian nationalism, so defined, shifted their energies from "an older state-focussed approach towards increasingly transnational political strategies" in which gender is barely evident.

In her explanation for the decline of this strain of nationalism, Bashevkin uses Barber's thesis from *Jihad vs McWorld*. Barber sees two threats facing Western democracies: the rise of exclusionary, intolerant, ethnic particularisms – Jihad – and the homogenising forces of global consumerism – McWorld. Bashevkin argues that English-Canadian nationalism declined because it failed to create a strong in-group identity and because the distinction between it and the out-group (American identity) became increasingly blurred. Compared to much stronger in-group solidarity in Québec, she argues left-of-centre English-Canadian nationalists' capacity to resist McWorld was limited, leading to bitter jealousy between some left-nationalists in English Canada and Québec. She concludes that behind the English Canada of this nationalism was an undifferentiated idea of Canada that mainly represented the identity of white, anglophone males.

Wilton and Vickers conceptualise English-Canadian nationalisms somewhat differently. Wilton focusses on the role of the IODE in ensuring the British nature of Canada in the first two decades of the twentieth century, when almost three million people immigrated. She focusses on Manitoba, which at the turn of the century "mirrored the ethnic and linguistic tensions that existed in Canada as a whole." Through the IODE, British-Canadian women worked to promote British institutions and ensure loyalty to Canada as part of the British Empire against French Canadians, Métis and Americans, whom they saw as their initial cultural competitors or as more or less rebellious pupils. They also engaged in projects: "[t]o make our New Canadians 100 per cent British in language, thought, feeling and impulse." They actively supported Anglo-conformism and assimilation by creating and disseminating symbols of the British-Canadian nation. Their support led to a mostly positive relationship with colonial nationalism. British-Canadian men accepted their public activity, including the franchise for white women.

Wilton also makes an important contribution to the theoretical literature concerning women's diverse relationships to nationalisms. She describes the relationship between maternal feminists and British-Canadian nationalism as *maternal nationalism*, because women's Canadianisation efforts involved moving their maternal gender roles into the public sphere. Wilton also notes that, although

British-Canadian women gained through this association with nationalism, they did so "often at the expense of the less privileged and immigrant men and women." She concludes that feminist scholarship, which debated if nationalism is good or bad for women, misses the point; the same nationalism may be good for some women but bad for others. Instead she asks, "What is the nature of a particular nationalism? How does it construct women? Which women participate? What are the effects of their actions?"

Jill Vickers explores the changing relationships between women's movements and majority-culture nationalisms at four times in Canadian history. Rejecting any essential relationship between feminism and nationalism, she argues that the context in which a relationship is formed shapes its character. So she explores relationships between particular women's organisations and specific strains of nationalism. Her analysis begins with a discussion of the links between maternal feminists and British-Canadian nationalisms. She then explores links between English-Canadian feminisms and nationalisms at three later points in time, demonstrating that these relationships vary over time because both the feminisms and nationalisms had changed. Vickers concludes that the positive link between British-Canadian feminism and nationalism in the early twentieth century is a thing of the past, since the fit between feminisms and majority-culture nationalisms has declined so much where there is little political space left in "reactive" Canadian nationalisms as advanced by neo-liberal and neo-conservative governments and oppositions.

As de Sève notes, English-Canadian and Québec feminists increasingly must scrutinise the capacity of our nationalisms to incorporate as equals women whose class, race, language, cultural loyalty or sexual orientation results in their exclusion. The question, "Where are you really from?" because of your skin colour or accent is a symptom of such exclusion. Vanaja Dhruvarajan, professor of sociology, University of Winnipeg and a recent president of the Canadian Sociological Association, writes about the experiences people of colour have had with Canadian and Québec nationalisms. Choosing the term "people of colour" for its political connotation, Dhruvarajan begins by stressing that, although "race" is a social construction, it has social consequences, because "whiteness carries with it privileges, non-whiteness disadvantages." Bashevkin may suggest that "Canadians" have failed to create strong in-group solidarity, but Dhruvarajan suggests that it is quite strong when viewed along racial lines, since "people of colour are not considered as belonging to Canada and therefore ... find it difficult to feel at home." Following Phillips, she argues that identity must include a sense of belonging, not just legal and civic rights. She asks, "Why are people of colour unable to feel at home and at ease even when they are born here?" She asserts that, although Canada has never

been culturally homogenous, it has been constructed as the product of white people. And she asserts that many Canadian nationalists have always worried about keeping Canada white and few acknowledge the roles of Indigenous peoples and of people of colour in building it.

Women of colour encounter racism and sexism. Dhruvarajan asserts that neither official multiculturalism nor the Charter of Rights have rectified the power imbalance that gives privilege to white Canadians and makes them the norm of “Canadian” nationalisms in various forms. Each generation of nationalists (and feminists) has participated in Canada’s “strategic amnesia” about its history of colonialism and its attachment to “white Canada” policies. She concludes that only systematic anti-racist policies can change this biased account.

Pauline Rankin, political scientist in the School of Canadian Studies at Carleton University, examines lesbian explorations of nationalisms and reveals how images of the “normal” citizen usually exclude lesbians and how the “re-imaginings” of movements like Queer Nation challenge such exclusions. The text explores the relationship between national identities and sexual minorities through a pink triangle of nationalism, sexual diversity and feminism. Rankin argues that, despite apparent liberalisation of policies around homosexuality, people in contemporary Canada remain keenly interested in what happens in the bedrooms of the nation. She then explores the situatedness of homosexual citizens within pan-Canadian nationalisms and of lesbians within articulations of “queer nationalism.”

Rankin analyses relationships between nationalisms and homophobia. She argues that sexual minorities must theorise nationalism from their perspectives, despite exclusions of “queer populations,” to achieve full citizenship and inclusion in nationalist discourse. She isolates the position of lesbians to consider if a re-imagined queer nationalism could be lesbian-friendly. Agreeing with Stychin that nationalisms reacting against uncertainties in the new world order will grab onto the heterosexual family as a familiar anchor, Rankin concludes that the current context makes the project of articulating an alternative, transformative, nationalist discourse “from a pink perspective” more pressing. She posits that re-imagining nationalist discourses in Canada can be liberatory for both queer and non-queer communities.

Conclusion

Does a vision emerge from this collection that points to a new future in Canada? We believe there are insights that point to new ways of conceptualising collective identities, including nationalisms. But we can provide no road-map of how we might get to such a future. None the less, we believe utopian visions may be of value in generating such a map. Most Euro-American nationalists believe, like John Stuart Mill (382), that liberal-democratic states ideally should be made up of

a single people "united among themselves by common sympathy." De Sève invokes this idea in her longing for a "deep, horizontal comradeship."

Mill is adamant that "Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities" (382). Mill, like Marx after him, also believed it justifiable for superior or "civilized" nations to assimilate inferior nations in their state's territory. We question if the goal – the comfort of sameness – is worth the price of eliminating the alternate visions evoked in this volume. The national principle of making nation and state commensurate presents itself as an ethical principle, but we see little that is ethical in forcible assimilation.

Lord Acton warned that always making state and nation commensurate usually results in "the inferior races [being] exterminated, or reduced to servitude or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence" (298). Acton's solution was federal states in which "inferior" nations would enjoy some measure of self-government. We do not agree that the 5,000-odd nations captive within about 200 states in the world (Hannum) are "inferior" except in not having the numbers, and so the democratic currency or the resources, to make state and nation commensurate for themselves. Anthony Smith also points to "the utopian dream" of umbrella states that work through an innovative form of federalism or confederalism so that each captive state can have some measure of autonomy or self-government, especially in cultural matters. In Canada, many people support the idea of a multinational state, but few can imagine how it could be achieved. And even if such a goal were achievable, it would not answer all the challenges presented in this volume. In politics, people are moved by collective identities other than the national.

The true utopian vision, perhaps, lies in the idea of nested identities; class, race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and faith intertwined and nested together within each nation, although differently organised in each. The idea that we are capable of multiple identities nested within each other and that we can have multiple loyalties we prioritise differently at different times perhaps comes more easily to women who often experience multiple loyalties and who must pursue their political goals in ways different from the stand-alone feminism of some majority women who have not learned the lessons of difference. Women also fight for autonomy and the right to govern ourselves without rejecting interdependence and mutual connection. But others have lessons to teach us in which gender does not matter. The vision of difference-in-unity that emerges from observing Blackfoot nationalism and Québécoises' struggles to be both womanists and nationalists offers exciting insights. So does our realisation that, although women's participation as agents in nation-building was often at the expense of other women, it also promoted democratic nationalisms through which the security of all inhabitants was preserved.

We do not conclude that nationalisms are always good for women or good for all women. But we do conclude that women's involvements in nationalist movements

can modify the character of those movements, and shape their agendas in woman-friendly and difference-friendly ways. We also believe that developing innovative forms of governance to accommodate the complex mix of loyalties and nested identities is possible in Canada; in this project of re-imagining collective identities and nationalisms for the new millennium, Canada in all its diversity should be at the centre of the debate, not just on its margins.

Notes

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1. We use the term to differentiate West European and non-European experiences. Clearly, the lands settled were only new to Europeans, and we acknowledge the centuries-old Indigenous civilizations and cultures that flourished in these regions thousands of years before European "discovery." The concept is problematic, as is the concept of settler societies used by some to identify countries where white Europeans settled and created new societies along European lines. The term suggests that Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States and the Latin American countries that were colonies of Europe built on the expropriation of Indigenous peoples may usefully be distinguished. Neither categorisation works fully.
2. See Chantal Maillé, Diane Lamoureux and Micheline de Sève, eds. *Malaises identitaires. Echanges féministes autour d'un Québec incertain* (Montreal: éditions du remue-ménage, 1998).
3. Federalism and local control over education, along with bilingualism or multiculturalism in many of the settler societies, indicate the European model was difficult to apply.
4. The National Action Committee on the Status of Women is an umbrella organization of more than 600 women's groups created in 1972 to lobby for implementation of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women.
5. While there is some political asymmetry in all federal systems, constitutional asymmetry – which recognises collective rights – is less common. Watts defines constitutional asymmetry in Canada as "the degree to which powers assigned to regional units by the constitution ... are not uniform" (57). It has existed since 1867 in denominational and linguistic guarantees in education, the use of French in the legislature, courts and the civil code. Since 1982, with the patriation of the Constitution – without Québec's consent – and the Charter of Rights – which established Aboriginal rights, sex equality and multiculturalism – more diversity is introduced that does not reside only in the political units (provinces and territories).
6. Feminist political science uses the concept of patriarchy to describe political systems in which men dominate in numbers and in values in all or most political institutions, as

is now the case in Canada in all its provinces and territories. Used in this way, the word patriarchal does not imply men have all power and women have none. Indeed, it assumes that male dominance and female power co-exist. So the election of a woman as leader of a provincial or territorial government or as prime minister does not alter the fact that most positions of political and economic power are held by men. See Jill Vickers, *Reinventing Political Science: A Feminist Approach* (Halifax: Fernwood Books, 1997) for a detailed account. See also Yolande Cohen, ed., *Women and Counter-Power* (Montreal: Blackrose Books, 1989) for an analysis of how women exercise power in the face of male dominance. When men dominate an institution or movement, women may still be active participants. Feminist political science uses the concept of critical mass to determine when the active presence of women changes the functioning and values of institutions and movements. Most research suggests that women must constitute at least a third of the membership and leadership before the threshold for significant change within a male-dominated institution is reached. Women's activity in women-led organizations, therefore, is often a better measure of their agency, hence the focus on women's organisations in some of the papers.

7. We hypothesise that white women in Australia and New Zealand shared this, but demonstrating it is beyond the scope of our text. The Canadian context differed because of competition between two settler societies and nationalisms.
8. Anderson also identifies a "New World" origin for nationalism among the Creoles. A number of Asian and African scholars have also challenged the European origin thesis. See, for example, Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (London: Zed Publishing, 1986).
9. Anderson notes in the most recent edition that European scholars ignored this as they embraced the rest of his thesis.
10. See Micheline de Sève, "Féminisme et nationalisme au Québec, une alliance inattendue," *International Journal of Canadian Studies/Revue internationale d'études canadiennes* 17 (April 1998): 157-75.
11. This strategy of legitimising colonial domination, and later internal colonialism, is also evident in the history of British colonial rule in India and Africa, where the pre-colonial existence of nations and nationalisms was also denied through the use of racist concepts such as tribe and tribalism.

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